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Abstract— grid is a collection of distributed computing 
resources. These resources are available over a local or wide area 
network that appears to an end user or application as one large 
virtual computing system. The vision is to create virtual dynamic 
organizations through secure and coordinated resource-sharing 
among individuals and institutions. Access control to these 
resources is a problem difficult to manage, how to store and 
manage the security policies of such a system plays a key role. If 
these policies are not properly stored, the response time to access 
control requests will be dramatically increased. Grid 
Authorization Graph (GAG) was proposed to improve the 
authorization efficiency by eliminating the redundancy in 
checking security rules. This article proposes the Weighted Grid 
Authorization Graph (WGAG) as an enhancement to GAG 
which further improves the authorization efficiency by avoiding a 
lots of security rule checking. Finally, as proof of concept, we 
implement the WGAG simulator where simulations were done. 
The obtained results show that the proposed model can 
effectively reduce the complexity of security rule checking and 
gave better results than GAG. 
Keywords— Grid computing; Access control; Grid 
authorization; HCM; GAG. 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
rid computing was introduced to allow multiple 
institutions to share their resources across multiple 
locations with a large number of users in a variety of 
organizations [1]. The security of such a system is a crucial 
issue. Not only the data has to be secured but also the 
resources and calculations must be protected from inadequate 
access [2]. Furthermore; the dynamicity and multi-domain 
characteristics of grid environments have created access 
control related challenges [3]. 
The traditional techniques of authorization are based on 
access control lists. This technique allows user whose name 
appears in the list to reach the grid based on the privileges 
associated with his/her name [4]. In this model, the resource 
providers have to maintain authorization decisions for every 
user, which is a very time consuming and non-scalable 
solution. 
To avoid the disadvantages of the preceding technique, the 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [6] has been introduced 
and replaced the traditional identity based lists. In RBAC 
model, the privileges are assigned to roles and roles to users; 
this made the management of the security policies more 
flexible. However; the concept of the hierarchy of roles in the 
RBAC model is a little ambiguous because in general it is 
incorrect to consider that the hierarchy of roles corresponds to 
the organizational hierarchy. In recent years, organizations 
start adopting approaches that pass attributes for authorization 
instead of passing user’s credentials. This model is named as: 
Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) [7]. ABAC makes it 
possible to represent the policies of an organization with more 
detailed criteria than RBAC. 
In [10] the authors concentrate on how to adopt an efficient 
structure to store security policies in grid environments, they 
spoke about how security policies were represented and 
checked using the Brute Force Approach (BFA). In this 
mechanism the entire security policies are required to be 
checked in order to find the user’s authorized resource group 
(UARG) which leads to huge repetition. Furthermore, authors 
think to cluster the resources which have identical security 
policies to reduce redundancy, it was done by the Primitive 
Clustering Mechanism (PCM), the authors observed that PCM 
removes the redundancy of checking the identical security 
policies but it cannot remove the redundancy of checking 
identical security rules. To avoid this redundancy, HCM was 
proposed. It considers the PCM’s parent node's information as 
a data to generate a hierarchical clustering of the parent nodes 
themselves depending on their shared security rules. In [11, 
12] authors discussed the limitations of HCM and noticed that 
it cannot represent the or-based security policies then they 
propose the Grid Authorization Graph (GAG), a decision 
graph derived from HCM by embedding special edges named 
“correspondent edges”. These can be used to entirely eliminate 
the redundancy of rules checking. However, some security 
rules do not need to be verified from the beginning 
This paper proposes a novel enhancement to GAG, so 
called as the Weighted Grid Authorization Graph (WGAG) 
which further improves the authorization process. The rest of 
this paper is organized as follows: section II describes the 
proposed architecture; Section III presents the WGAG 
algorithm. In section IV, experiments are presented to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the proposed model. Conclusion and 
future work are given in section V. 
  
G
 II. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE  
A grid environment usually consists of more than one 
domain in a hierarchical fashion [5]. Each domain has an 
administrator that manages the whole grid scenario for that 
domain by adding/editing resource access policies. These 
policies are generally written in XML file. Previous section 
gave more important mechanisms proposed to store security 
policies and manage them. The more efficient result was given 
by grid authorization graph (GAG) [11]. As each edge in 
graph can have a weight, one can think of assigning a weight 
(non-negative integer) to every edge in the decision graph 
which reflects the importance degree of the security rule 
which the edge emerges from. Then an attribute named 
“classification level” can be assigned to every resource which 
is a numerical value that equals the weight of the shortest path 
from the root node to the resource’s node (sum of weights of 
edges), as shown in the (fig.2) every user in the system has an 
attribute named “security clearance” derived out of user’s set 
of roles in the system, one  can avoid parsing the decision 
graph for authorizing a user Ui whose security clearance 
(USC(Ui)) is less than the classification level of resource rj 
(RCL(rj)), that is (USC(Ui)) < (RCL(rj)). Thus the developed 
weighted GAG with the following details: 
 
• Let SR= { srj | j=1 … l } be the set of all security 
rules.  
• Let IDSR: SR→ N: IDSR (srj) = the Importance 
Degree of security rule srj. 
• Let G (V; E) be the Grid Authorization Graph GAG, 
where V is the set of vertices ( security rules) and E 
is the set of edges. 
• Let W: E→ N: W (eij) = IDSR (sri) be a function 
defines edges’ weights in GAG. Where sri is the rule 
which the edge eij emerges from. 
• Let R= {rj|j=1…n} be the set of grid resources. 
• Let SP: R→ N: SP (rj) = weight of the shortest path 
to resource rj. 
• Let RCL: R→ N: RCL (rj) = SP (rj) be a function 
maps each resource to its classification level. 
• Let Role={rolei|i=1…s} bet the set of user’s roles 
• Let IDR: Roles → N: IDR (rolej) = the importance 
degree of rolej. 
• Let U = {Ui | i= 1…m} be the set of all users. 
• Let UR Ϲ U× Roles: be the set of relations of user to 
role assignements. 
• Let USR: U→ Roles : USR(ui) = {rolej | (ui, rolej) € 
UR} be a function derived from UR mapping each 
user to a set of roles. 
• Let USC: U→ N: USC (Ui) = ∑roles ϵ USR(Ui) 
IDR(rolej) be a function maps each user to his 
security clearance. 
 
Let us consider now the following example: A grid 
environment has 5 resources R= {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5}, and 3 
security rules SR= {sr1, sr2, sr3} with their importance degree 
(Illustrated in table 1) 
 
• sr1 requires the user to be from XYZ university  
• sr2 requires the user to have a Student role  
• sr3 requires the user to have a programmer role 
The five resources have the following security policies: 
• r1, r2 require sr1. 
• r3 requires sr1 and sr2. 
• r4 requires sr1 and sr2 and sr3. 
• r5 require sr1 and sr2 and sr3. 
 
The proposed architecture is illustrated in (Fig.1), the 
authorization server contains the following components: 
policy information point (PIP) [4], the Policy Enforcement 
point (PEP) [4], the Policy decision point (PDP) [4] and some 
others modules were added to make the framework compatible 
with the Weighted Grid authorization Graph (WGAG) like:  
 
TABLE 1. SECURITY RULES’ IMPORTANCE DEGREE 
Security rule Importance degree 
Sr1 4 
Sr2 1 
Sr3 9 
  
RAP [11] (Request Analyzer and Processor), WGAG Search 
engine, WGAG database, XML parser [11].  
Security policies of resources are submitted by the 
administrator using the SAML specification language [8] or 
XACML [9], an XML parser [11] is required to browse the 
XML file and give as a result a security table, as shows the 
table 2 is the result of security policies previously cited. 
The WGAG generator engine is responsible to build the 
proposed weighted grid authorization graph (WGAG) out of 
the security table generated by the XML Parser. Practically, it 
is a direct implementation of WGAG generator algorithm 
whose pseudo code is shown in section III.  the vertices of the 
graph represent the security rules, but the weighted edges will 
have the importance degree of security rules like value, the 
leaves of the graph represent the resources, then for each 
resource ri; the graph have to be parsed to calculate the 
shortest path from root to ri, the obtained value is taken as 
classification level of ri (illustrated in Fig.2). Following this it 
maintains the output decision graph in WGAG data base to be 
used by WGAG search engine. 
 
A. Resource group authorization mode  
When a user raises an access request, the PEP 
intercepts the request and propagates it to the PDP; the request 
is kept in a queue in PDP. The RAP is a simple action listener 
which listens on the PDP queue [11]. Once the request is 
enrolled into the queue, RAP picks up the request; fetches the 
authorization attributes of correspondent subject from PIP as 
the user security clearance CL(Ui ) afterwards the RAP sends 
the request to the WGAG search engine, this last will parse the 
weighted grid authorization graph and gives the group of 
resources that satisfy : CL(ri) ≤ SC(Ui). Finally, the group of 
 resources is sent to RAP, then to PEP (example shown in 
Fig.4). 
 
B. One resource authorization mode  
When a user Ui raises an access request to a special 
resource ri, the PEP intercepts the request and propagates it to 
the PDP, the request is kept in a queue in PDP. The RAP picks 
the request, fetches the authorization attributes of 
correspondent subject from PIP, as user security clearance 
CL(Ui) then the RAP sends the request to the WGAG search 
engine, this last will parse the weighted grid authorization 
graph for the special resource ri and gives accepted access as 
result if: CL (ri) ≤ SC (Ui) else denied, the answer is sent to 
RAP, then to PEP. 
 
TABLE 2. RESULT OF XML PARSER 
      sri     
ri 
Sr1 Sr2 Sr3 
r1 1 0 0 
r2 1 0 0 
r3 1 1 0 
r4 1 1 1 
r5 1 1 1 
III. WEIGHTED GRID AUTHORIZATION GRAPH 
GENERATOR ALGORITHM 
 
Inputs: Resources’ Security Table, Security Rules Importance 
Degree Table  
Outputs: Weighted Grid Authorization Graph (WGAG) 
Variables:  
[1]SRV: a vector of all security rules.  
[2]Each node (N) in the graph is a structure of 3 fields: 
 - The security rule sr  
- An interim security table ST 
 - Undirected correspondent edge from the node to the 
representative sr cell in SRV.  
[3]Each edge (e) in the graph has a weight w that is an integer 
representing the degree of importance of the security rule sr in 
security rules importance degree table IDT.  
[4]Each resource ri in the graph is a structure of 2 fields: 
 - Label  
- CL an integer that represent the classification level of the 
resource.  
Begin  
Step 1:  
• Initialize the decision tree by root node (N) with 
“ROOT” as label of security rule.  
• Build the security table ST which represents the 
entire Security policy of the system; assign it as a 
security table (ST) property of the root node.  
• Build the importance degree table IDT which 
represents the importance degree of each security 
rule. Execute the step 2 for the root node. 
Step 2:  
• Add each resource ri whose correspondent row in 
N’ST has 0 cells, as a child resource to N. 
•  Sum the cells of each column of N’ST and refer it as 
count.  
• Choose the security rule srj with the highest count. 
• Divide ST into two tables, excluding the jth column 
as the following:  
 The first table T1 contains the rows of 
resources which demand srj (each row 
whose jth cell >0).  
 The second table T2 contains the rows of 
resources which do not demand srj (each 
row whose jth cell=0).  
• Add a left child node LCN to N with srj as a security 
rule (sr) and T1 as the security table ST; the weight 
of srj in IDT as weight of LCN. Let the 
correspondent edge of LCN refers to sr’j cell in SRV 
• Add a right child RCN to N with NULL as security 
rule sr, T2 as security table ST and 0 as weight of 
RCN. Let the correspondent edge of RCN refers to 
Null.  
Step 3: Repeat step 2 for each child until a child with empty 
security table is reached.  
Step4: for each resource ri in the graph a shortest path from 
the root node to this resource is calculated and added to CL of 
ri. 
Step 5: Prune the graph at nodes labeled ROOT. Erase all 
interim security tables (ST) to free space.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. SIMULATIONS AND RESULT 
For grid environment of 100 resources and 8 security rules, 
100 different authorization processes have been initiated. For 
each authorization process, the posterior analysis of GAG and 
WGAG has been done and depicted in Fig.3 (X axis is for the 
authorization process number (experiment N°) and Y axis is 
for the authorization complexity (number of checked security 
rules)). 
 
Fig. 1 Proposed architecture: an extended XACML model (Shaded 
components are our contribution) 
  
As shown in Fig.3, we can find that WGAG complexity is 
always lower than GAG complexity, this is due to the use of 
classification level and security clearance attributes in WGAG 
model, because when one user has a security clearance inferior 
than resource classification level, the graph will not be parsed 
at all in case of WGAG, however GAG parse all the graph to 
check if resource security policy is satisfied by user roles.  
One of most remarkable points of the result is that WGAG 
complexity reaches zero sometimes while GAG complexity is 
always superior than zero, this is due to the use of one 
resource authorization mode, because when user security 
clearance is inferior than resource classification level, there is 
no security rule to be checked in WGAG case, but using GAG 
implies checking one security rule at least. 
So the analyze and simulations indicate that WGAG can 
effectively reduce the complexity of security rules checking, 
besides we can say that WGAG improves the access control 
process and gives better results than GAG. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
In this article, various mechanisms used for security 
policies storage and management in grid computing 
environment were compared , to enhance grid access 
control process, weighted Grid Authorization Graph 
(WGAG) is proposed, it is derived from Grid 
Authorization Graph (GAG). Summing up the results, it 
can be concluded that while GAG eliminates the 
redundancy in checking security rules, WGAG security 
rules checking can be equal to zero. In our future 
research we intend to concentrate on cross domain access 
control architecture based on WGAG. 
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